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Abstract
We present a stock market model that quantitatively replicates the joint behavior of stock
prices, trading volume and investor expectations. Stock prices in the model occasionally display
belief-driven boom and bust cycles that delink asset prices from fundamentals and redistribute
considerable amounts of wealth from less to more experienced investors. Although gains from
trade arise only from subjective belief di¤erences, introducing nancial transactions taxes (FTTs)
remains undesirable. While FTTs reduce the size and length of boom-bust cycles, they increase
the likelihood of such cycles, therby overall return volatility and wealth redistribution. Contingent
FTTs, which are levied only above a certain price threshold, give rise to problems of equilibrium
multiplicity and non-existence.
Keywords: nancial transactions tax, Tobin tax, asset price booms
JEL classication: G12, D84
1. Introduction
Following the nancial crisis, there has been a widespread desire among policymakers
to introduce nancial transaction taxes (FTTs). The European Commission, for example,
proposed the introduction of FTTs in September 2011. Subsequently, France introduced in
2012 a 0.1% tax on stock market and related transactions and has recently increased the tax
rate to 0.2%. Italy introduced a 0.1% tax on stock market transactions in 2013.1
Corresponding author: Klaus Adam, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, L7,3-5, 68131
Mannheim, Germany, adam@uni-mannheim.de. We thank Eduardo Dávila, Martin Ellison, Guido Loren-
zoni, Carsten Trenkler, Mirko Wiederholt, seminar participants at the 2014 JME Gerzensee Conference,
Deutsche Bundesbank, European Central Bank, the 2015 CSEF-CIM-UCL Conference in Ischia, the 2015
Barcelona Summer Forum on Finance and Macroeconomics, the 2015 Conference on Expectations in Dynamic
Macroeconomic Model in Eugene, Oregon for helpful comments and suggestions. Klaus Adam acknowledges
funding from ERC starting grant no. 284262, Boom & Bust Cycles. Albert Marcet acknowledges support
from Programa de Excelencia del Banco de España, Plan Nacional (Ministry of Education), SGR (Generalitat
de Catalunya) and ERC advanced grant no. 324048. All errors remain ours.
1FTTs are already a widely used tax instrument in housing markets. Spain, for example, levies an 8%
transaction tax on real estate transactions and Germany levies a 5% tax, both additionally levy capital gains
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One of the stated policy objectives of the European Commission is that FTTs should dis-
courage nancial transactions which do not contribute to the e¢ ciency of nancial markets.
The present paper seeks to analyze to what extent FTTs actually increase the e¢ ciency of
stock market transactions and stock market prices. In particular, it investigates whether
FTTs can prevent boom and bust like dynamics in stock prices; over recent decades such
price dynamics have become pervasive in a number of important stock markets and have
contributed to the redistribution of wealth between di¤erent kinds of investors.2 The ef-
fect that FTTs have on boom-bust like dynamics in stock markets should thus be of prime
importance to policymakers.
To analyze this issue, we use a modeling framework that can generate stock price uc-
tuations roughly of the size observed in the data, including occasional large upswings and
reversals in stock market prices. The model also quantitatively replicates important data
moments characterizing the behavior of trading volume, as well as its comovement with
stock prices and investor expectations. Credibly replicating the behavior of trading volume
appears key for an analysis that seeks to understand the e¤ects of taxing trading activity
and is a distinguishing feature of the present analysis.3
Besides being quantitatively plausible, our modeling framework gives FTTs the best
possible chance to generate positive welfare e¤ects: rst, we consider a framework where
subjective belief components cause asset prices not to be fully e¢ cient, so that there is -
at least in principle - room for increasing the e¢ ciency of nancial market prices; second,
within the presented framework, the gains from trade exist only in subjective terms, i.e., due
to belief di¤erences, so that taxing trading activity may appear desirable on a priori grounds,
see Simsek (2013); third, we abstract from a number of adverse consequences likely to be
associated with the introduction of FTTs, such as costly evasive behavior, which may involve
redirecting orders to other exchanges, the adverse liquidity e¤ects resulting from nancial
market fragmentation, or the costly creation of alternative nancial instruments that are not
subject to the tax.
Our main nding is that even within this very conducive setting, the introduction of FTTs
fails to discourage transactions which do not contribute to the e¢ ciency of nancial markets.
Indeed, we nd that the introduction of FTTs increases the likelihood that the stock market
embarks on a signicant boom and bust cycle in valuation, and thereby increases the overall
amount of wealth redistribution. The reasons for this nding are subtle, as we explain
taxes.
2See Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) for evidence on how the tech stock boom and bust around the year
2000 redistributed wealth between hedge fund and other investors.
3See section 2. for a discussion of the related literature.
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below, but show that FTTs may actually not be a suitable policy instrument for increasing
the e¢ ciency of stock markets.
The modeling framework used in the present paper builds upon prior work by Adam,
Marcet and Beutel (2015), which replicates stock price behavior within a representative agent
framework with time separable preferences. The present analysis adds (1) by introducing
investor heterogeneity and thereby equilibrium trade, (2) by showing that the resulting
trading patterns are empirically plausible, and (3) by studying the pricing and welfare e¤ects
of introducing FTTs.
While the equilibrium pricing patterns of the representative agent model in Adam, Marcet
and Beutel (2015) prove rather robust to introducing agent heterogeneity, i.e., stock prices
continue to be very volatile and to display occasional boom-bust cycles, the addition of agent
heterogeneity helps in generating auto-correlated trading volume, trading volume that cor-
relates positively with absolute price changes, and trading volume that correlates positively
with investor disagreement, in line with what is found in the data.
The presented model is one where boom-bust dynamics arise from subjective price beliefs,
but in a setting where investors take fully optimal investment decisions given their beliefs,
following Adam and Marcet (2011). The introduction of subjective stock price beliefs is
motivated by empirical evidence presented in Adam, Marcet and Beutel (2015), who show
that the joint dynamics of realized capital gains and capital gain expectations, as observed
from survey data, are strongly inconsistent with the rational expectations hypothesis. This
implies - amongst other things - that rational asset price bubbles, e.g., those derived in classic
work by Froot and Obstfeld (1991), are inconsistent with the joint dynamics of actual and
expected capital gains in the data.
Following Adam, Marcet and Beutel (2015), we consider investors who hold subjective
stock price beliefs of a kind such that Bayesian updating causes investors to extrapolate (to
di¤erent degrees) past capital gains into the future. The degree of extrapolation is thereby
calibrated to the one that we document to be present in survey data. In particular, we show
that less experienced stock market investors extrapolate more compared to investors with
longer investment experience.
Extrapolative behavior, which gives rise to investor optimism and pessimism, potentially
supports a strong argument in favor of introducing FTTs. Specically, in our setting, price
booms emerge because investors become optimistic once they see past prices going up, caus-
ing them to bid up todays prices, thereby creating additional optimism in the next period
and further price increases. FTTs can prevent investors from trading on their optimistic
beliefs, i.e., prevent them from bidding up prices once optimism has increased, thereby
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preventing the positive feedback loop between price increases and increased optimism just
described.
While intuitively plausible, this argument ignores an important additional consequence
of FTTs. By preventing agents from trading, even arbitrarily small exogenous shocks to
stock supply can have a disproportionately large e¤ect on realized prices. Specically, linear
transaction taxes imply that investors, whose stockholdings are close to their subjectively
optimal level, do not want to trade, unless there is a signicant change in the stock price.4
As a result, FTTs can increase price volatility in normal times. With realized prices feeding
into investorsbeliefs, due to extrapolative behavior, this ultimately increases the likelihood
that the stock market embarks on a large self-fueling boom and subsequent bust.
Our quantitative analysis shows that FTTs manage to decrease the size and duration of
stock price booms, including the volatility of prices during boom times. At the same time,
FTTs increase price volatility during normal times.5 The predicted e¤ect of a 4% FTT is
an increase by one third of the number of stock price boom episodes relative to the case
without taxes. Since price and return volatility is higher during boom times, the overall
e¤ect of FTTs is to increase stock price volatility.
Motivated by the observation that it is undesirable to levy FTTs in normal times, as they
increase price volatility and thereby the likelihood of boom-bust cycles, we also consider the
e¤ects of state contingent taxes that are only levied once prices exceed a certain threshold.
We show that such taxes give rise to non-continuous stock demand functions and thereby to
problems of equilibrium multiplicity and non-existence. State-contingent transaction taxes
appear problematic on these grounds.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2. discusses some of the
related literature. Section 3. provides basic facts about the joint behavior of stock prices,
trading volume and investor expectations that we seek to quantitatively match within our
asset pricing framework. Section 4. introduces the asset pricing model. Section 5. shows
that the model performs poorly in terms of replicating price and trading dynamics when
investors hold rational price expectations. Section 6. evaluates the quantitative performance
of the model with subjective price beliefs and in the absence of a transactions tax. In section
7. we show how stock price boom and bust dynamics redistribute wealth between di¤erent
4This is so because the gains from trade are of second order close to the optimum, while the cost of the
tax are of rst order.
5Normal times are times that are not classied as boom times. Boom times begin when the quarterly
price dividend ratio exceeds a certain level and end when the PD ratio falls below a certain lower level. In
our numerical application, we set the rst threshold to 250 and latter to 200. Results turn out to be are
rather robust to the precise threshold values.
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investor types. Section 8. presents the implications of introducing linear FTTs and section
9. considers the e¤ects of state-contingent taxes. A conclusion briey summarizes. Technical
material and information about the employed data sources is summarized in an appendix.
2. Related Literature
The present paper is closely connected to an extensive literature on nancial transaction
taxes going at least back to the well-known proposal by Tobin (1978). We provide here a
selective overview of the literature, making reference to work that is most closely related to
the present paper.
In a comprehensive theoretical study, Dávila (2013) determines optimal linear transaction
taxes for a setting where investors hold heterogeneous beliefs. He shows that the optimal
transaction tax of a social planner who maximizes social welfare under her own (possibly
di¤erent) probability beliefs, depends on the cross-sectional covariance between investors
beliefs and equilibrium portfolio sensitivities.
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) analyze how asset price bubbles and trading volume are
a¤ected by transactions taxes in a setting with risk neutral investors who face a short-sale
constraint and who hold di¤erent beliefs because they assign di¤erent information content to
publicly available signals. In their setting, transaction taxes strongly a¤ect trading volume
but may have only a limited e¤ect on the size of asset price bubbles.
The present paper adds to these contributions by considering the e¤ects of FTTs within
a quantitatively credible setting that replicates important data moments describing the joint
behavior of stock prices, trading volume and investor expectations. Furthermore, by incor-
porating learning from market prices, investorsbelief distortions depend in important ways
on market outcomes. This gives rise to feedback e¤ects that are absent in models in which
agents consider market prices to o¤er only redundant information.
In related work, Buss et al. (2013) consider the e¤ects of FTTs and other policy in-
struments on stock market volatility in a production economy in which some stock market
participants overinterpret the information content of public signals, as in Dumas et al. (2009).
The present paper considers an endowment economy but evaluates model performance also
with regard to the ability to match trading activity. Similar to our ndings, Buss et al.
(2013) show how nancial transaction taxes increase the volatility of stock market returns.
With nancial transaction taxes being almost equivalent to trading costs, the present
paper also relates to the transaction costs literature. As in Constantinides (1986), transaction
costs generate within the present setup partially at demand curves, see also subsequent work
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by Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) and Heaton and Lucas (1996). Di¤erent from Constantinides
(1986), the asset price e¤ects of transaction costs fail to be of second order within the present
setting because we consider agents that use price realizations to update beliefs about the
price process. Guasoni and Muhle-Karbe (2013) and Vayanos and Wang (2014) provide
recent surveys of the transaction cost literature.
Empirical evidence on the volatility e¤ects of nancial transaction taxes is provided in
Umlauf (1993), Jones and Seguin (1997) and Hau (2006). These studies tend to nd that
market volatility increases with the introducing of a tax, see also McCulloch and Pacillo
(2011) for a recent overview of the empirical literature. Coelho (2014) and Colliard and
Ho¤mann (2015) analyze the recent experiences with the introduction of FTTs in France
and Italy, documenting how FTTs increase price volatility and reduce market depth.
The market microstructure literature also studies nancial transaction taxes, focusing on
the di¤erential impact that such taxes have on the participation of noise traders, which create
exogenous market volatility or mispricing, versus the participation of informed traders who
evaluate prices according to fundamentals, see for example Jeanne and Rose (2002) or Hau
(1998). The general conclusion of this theoretical literature is that if nancial transaction
taxes cause noise traders to participate less in the market, then market volatility can fall as
a result.
3. Stock Prices, Price Expectations and Trading Volume: Empirical Evidence
This section documents key facts about the joint behavior of U.S. stock prices, investors
price expectations and stock market trading volume that we seek to quantitatively replicate
with our asset pricing model. The next section presents empirical evidence about stock price
behavior, the behavior of dividends and the behavior of average stock price expectations.
Section 3.2. complements this with key facts about the behavior of trading volume and its
relation with price behavior and the behavior of price expectations. It shows - amongst
other things - that trading volume correlates positively with disagreement across investors
about future prices. Finally, section 3.3. shows that disagreement between investors can be
systematically related to investorsstock market experience.
3.1. Stock Prices, Dividends and Average Price Expectations
Table 1 presents key facts about the behavior of quarterly U.S. stock prices, dividends
and stock return expectations as available from survey data.6 The facts presented in table
6The data sources used in this and the subsequent sections are described in appendix A1..
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1 are the main data moments guiding the analysis in Adam, Marcet and Beutel (2015) and
we summarize them here for convenience.7
Table 1 shows that the average quarterly price dividend ratio (E[PD]) is around 140
and has a standard deviation (std(PD)) of approximately half its average value.8 Stock
prices are thus very volatile. The quarterly auto-correlation of the price dividend (PD) ratio
(corr(PDt; PDt 1)) is 0.98, showing that deviations of the PD ratio from its sample mean
are very persistent over time. As a result, quarterly real stock returns are very volatile, with
a standard deviation (std(rs)) of around 8% per quarter. Real stock returns are thus much
more volatile than real dividend growth, which has a standard deviation (std(Dt=Dt 1)) of
just 1.92%. The mean real stock return (E[rs]) is 1.89% per quarter and much higher than
the average growth rate of real dividends (E[Dt=Dt 1   1]), which equals 0.48% per quarter.
Table 1 also documents that the average investors expected real returns in the UBS sur-
vey correlates strongly and positively with the PD ratio (corr(PDt; EtRt+1)): the correlation
equals 0:79.9 Adam, Marcet and Beutel (2015) show that this fact is robust against using
other survey data sources and against alternative ways to distill expectations from the sur-
vey data. They also show that this fact is inconsistent with investors holding rational price
expectations, which is why we include the correlation between the PD ratio and expected
returns in the set of data moments that we seek to match.
[Table 1 about here]
3.2. Trading Volume, Stock Prices and Disagreement
This section presents empirical facts about trading activity and its comovement with
prices and price expectations. It shows that trading volume is highly persistent, that trading
volume is largely uncorrelated with stock market valuation, instead correlates positively with
absolute price changes. Furthermore, it documents - to our knowledge for the rst time - that
aggregate trading volume and disagreement about future aggregate stock market returns, as
measured by survey data, are positively correlated.
7We include here all asset pricing facts considered in Adam, Marcet and Beutel (2015), except for those
involving the bond market, as the present model does not feature a bond market.
8The quarterly PD ratio is dened as the price over quarterly dividend payments, see appendix A1. for
further details.
9The number reported in table 1 uses the mean of the expected returns of the own portfolio return
expectations of all investors in the UBS survey. The survey data are avaialable from 1998:Q2 to 2007:Q2
and have been transformed into real values using the median of expected ination reported in the survey of
professional forecasters.
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The nance literature studies a range of empirical measures to capture trading activity,
see Lo and Wang (2009) for an overview. To account for trading in individual shares, Lo
and Wang argue that shares traded divided by shares outstanding is a natural measure of
trading activity when viewed in the context of standard portfolio theory and equilibrium
asset-pricing models (p.243). Clearly, for individual shares, this measure is identical to
using the dollar volume of shares traded divided by the dollar volume of shares outstanding.
Since this latter measure aggregates more naturally across di¤erent stocks and since we are
interested in the aggregate stock market, we use the dollar volume of shares traded over the
dollar volume of share outstanding as our preferred measure of trading volume.
We aggregate daily trading volume into a quarterly series by summing up the daily
trading volumes over the quarter, following Lo and Wang (2009). While being standard, this
procedure is likely going to lead to an overstatement of the model relevant trading volume, as
many of the daily trades recorded in the data may be reversed with opposing trades within
the same quarter. Indeed, with the advent of high frequency trading strategies, many of the
recorded trades are likely to be undone within seconds, if not milliseconds. Dealing properly
with this issue in the data is di¢ cult, as it would require information about individual
portfolios of all investors. We seek to account - at least partially - for the increasing share
of high-frequency trades over time, therefore use detrended data on trading volume. Since
detrending can a¤ect the cyclical properties of the trading volume series, we report below
only facts that turn out to be robust to a range of plausible detrending methods.
Figure 1 depicts the (undetrended) quarterly trading volume of the U.S. stock market,
where data is available from January 1973. Trading volume displays a clear upward trend
over time. In the early 1970s trade during a quarter amounted to around 5% of the market
value of outstanding shares; at the end of the sample period this number reaches close to
50%; the data also shows temporary spikes in trading volume around the 1987, 2000 and
2008 stock market busts.
[Figure 1 about here]
Table 2 presents a number of facts about detrended trading volume. As a baseline, we
use simple linear detrending, but the table also displays outcomes for other commonly used
detrending methods. In particular, it considers linear-quadratic detrending, the outcomes
obtained from HP-ltering with a smoothing parameter of 1600, as well as so-called moving
average (MA) detrending, which normalizes trading volume by the average trading volume
recorded in the preceding four quarters.
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Table 2 shows that trading volume displays considerable autocorrelation across quarters.
The autocorrelation is statistically signicant at the 1% level for all detrending methods.10
For higher frequencies, this is a well-known fact that has been documented in the nance
literature, we show it here for the quarterly frequency at which we will evaluate our asset
pricing model.
Table 2 also shows that there exists no statistically signicant correlation between trading
volume and the level of the PD ratio. This illustrates that claims about the existence of
a high correlation between the level of stock prices and trading volume, see for example
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and the references cited therein, disappear once one removes
the trend displayed by trading volume.11
The previous nding does not imply that trading volume and prices are unrelated. In-
deed, as table 2 documents, trading volume correlates positively and in a statistically highly
signicant way with absolute price changes. This nding holds again for all detrending meth-
ods. It is in line with patterns documented by Karpo¤ (1987) and shows that periods of
high volume are associated with large price changes.
[Table 2 about here]
The facts presented in table 2 are fairly standard in the light of the existing nance liter-
ature studying trading volume. We complement these facts below with additional empirical
evidence on the relationship between trading volume and belief disagreement. Models in
which investors disagree about the future prospects from investment have a long tradition in
the nance literature, see Hong and Stein (2007) for a survey. We document in table 3 below
that there exists a fairly robust positive correlation between aggregate trading volume and
the amount of cross-sectional disagreement about future aggregate stock market returns.
Table 3 reports the correlation between trading volume and the cross-sectional standard
deviations of real survey return expectations (corr(TVt; std( eEitRt+1))), as obtained from
various survey data sources.12 The point estimate of the correlation is always positive and
often statistically signicant when using linear or linear-quadratic detrending or the HP
lter. The evidence is less strong when detrending trading volume using the moving average
10We test the null hypothesis H0 : corr(; ) = 0 in this and subsequent tables using robust standard errors,
following Roy and Cléroux (1993), which are implemented with a Newey-West estimator with 4 leads and
lags.
11Our ndings also hold true if one uses data only up to the year 2006, which shows that results are not
driven by the recent nancial crisis.
12Since the Shiller survey asks for expected capital gains, the reported correlations for this survey pertain
to the cross-sectional dispersion of capital gain expectations.
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approach, but is otherwise rather robust. Furthermore, to document that results are not
driven by outliers in the surveys, table 3 also reports the correlation between detrended
trading volume and the inter-quartile range (IQR) of the cross-section of survey expectations
(corr(TVt; IQR( eEitRt+1))).13 Results turn out to be robust towards using this alternative
dispersion measure.
Overall, the evidence in table 3 shows that trading volume and disagreement are positively
correlated in the data.
[Table 3 about here]
3.3. Disagreement and Stock Market Experience
Given the evidence presented in the previous section, which shows that investor disagree-
ment is systematically related to trading volume, this section explores potential sources of
investor disagreement more closely. In particular, it shows that disagreement can be partly
related to investor experience: the price expectations of investors with less stock market
experience are more heavily inuenced by recent stock market performance than those with
more experience.
Adam, Marcet and Beutel (2015) show that the empirical time series behavior of the
average price growth expectation in the UBS survey data (Et[Pt+1=Pt]) can be captured
very well by an extrapolative updating equation of the form
Et[Pt+1=Pt] = Et 1[Pt=Pt 1] + g

Pt
Pt 1
  Et 1[Pt=Pt 1]

; (1)
which stipulates that the average investor extrapolates observed capital gains into the future.
We document below that investors with di¤erent numbers of years of experience extrapolate
to di¤erent degrees.
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of quarterly real price growth expectations held by investors
with di¤erent years of stock market experience, as available from the UBS survey.1415 It
13For the CFO survey, we do not observe individual survey responses or the interquartile range, thus
cannot perform this robustness check.
14We choose experience groups with equidistant group boundaries (except for the highest group) and in
a way that groups are approximately of similar size. The reported results are robust to using di¤erent
numbers of groups or di¤erent group boundaries, provided one does not consider too many groups, which
causes results to become more noisy.
15The gure reports the own portfolioreturn expectations from the UBS survey, as these are available for a
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shows that in the year 1999 and until the beginning of the year 2000, when prior stock market
returns have been very high due to the preceding tech stock boom, it is the less experienced
investors that tend to be most optimistic about future capital gains. Indeed, investors with
0-5 years of experience expect an average real capital gain of around 3.5% per quarter, i.e., a
real gain of about 14% per year, while the most experienced group expects considerably lower
capital gains (albeit still very high ones by historical standards). Following the subsequent
stock market bust, belief dispersion across investor groups signicantly narrows and reaches a
low point during the stock market trough in the year 2003. Clearly, this happens because less
experienced investors updated expectations more strongly during the market bust. Following
the stock market recovery after the year 2003, belief dispersion widened again, with the least
experienced investor group then holding once more the highest return expectations, while
the two most experienced groups hold the lowest expectations.
Figure 2 suggests, in line with evidence presented in Malmendier and Nagel (2011), that
the capital gain expectations of less experienced investors react more strongly to realized
capital gains. We formally check this hypothesis by estimating the updating parameter g in
equation (1) for each experience group separately, using the same approach as employed in
Adam, Marcet and Beutel (2015). Table 4 reports the estimation outcome and shows that
the updating parameter is monotonically decreasing with experience, with the updating
parameter of the most inexperienced group of investors being approximately 75% higher
than that of the most experienced investor group. The estimated updating gains are all
statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 1% level.16 Appendix A4. shows that
the gains are signicantly di¤erent from each other for su¢ ciently distant experience groups
and that the gain of the most experienced investor group is di¤erent from those of all other
groups at the 1% level.
[Figure 2 about here]
[Table 4 about here]
longer time period. Results do not depend on this choice, though. We transform nominal return expectations
into real expectations using the median ination forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. To be
consistent with our asset pricing model, which models capital gain expectations, we transform real return
expectations into a measure of real price growth expectations using the identity Rt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
+ Dt+1Pt =
Pt+1
Pt
+ DDtPt where 
D denotes the expected gross quarterly real growth rate of dividends that we set equal
to its sample average, i.e, D = 1:0048, see table 1. Results are very similar when using alternative plausible
values for D. Also, since the UBS survey does not have a panel structure, the gure is based on a pseudo
panel and reports at each point in time the median expectation of the considered experience group.
16Standard errors in table 4 and the p-values reported in appendix A4. are computed in a standard way,
exploiting the fact that the procedure used for estimating the gain is a nonlinear least squares estimation.
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4. The Asset Pricing Model
This section presents the asset pricing model that we use to replicate the empirical facts
documented in the previous section. We consider a model with a unit mass of atomistic
investors who trade on a competitive stock market, where trade may be subject to a linear
transactions tax. At the beginning of each period, stocks pay a stochastic dividend Dt per
unit and investors earn an exogenous wage income Wt. Income from both sources takes the
form of perishable consumption goods.
There are I  1 types of investors in the economy and a mass i > 0 of each type
i 2 f0; : : : ; Ig, where PIi=1 i = 1. Types di¤er with respect to the beliefs they entertain
about the behavior of future stock prices and with regard to their accumulated stockholdings.
For the special case without a nancial transactions tax and when there is a single investor
type, the setup reduces to the one studied in Adam, Marcet and Beutel (2015).
The Investment Problem. The representative investor of type i 2 f1; :::; Ig solves
max
fCit0;Sitg1t=0
EP
i
0
1X
t=0
t
(Cit)
1 
1   (2)
s.t.: SitPt + C
i
t = S
i
t 1 (Pt +Dt) +Wt   
(Sit   Sit 1)Pt+ T it
Si 1 given,
where Ci denotes consumption,  > 1 the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, Si the agents
stockholdings, P  0 the (ex-dividend) price of the stock,   0 a linear nancial transactions
tax, which is levied on the agentstrading volume
(Sit   Sit 1)Pt and T i  0 lump sum tax
rebates.
Investorschoices are contingent on the history of variables that are exogenous to their
decision problem, i.e., time t choices depend on fPj; Dj;Wj; Tjgtj=0 and the initial condition
Si 1. P i denotes a subjective probability measure, which assigns probabilities to all possible
innite histories fPt; Dt;Wt; Ttg1t=0. The agents subjective probabilities may or may not
coincide with the objective probabilities, i.e., agents may not know the true probabilities
characterizing the behavior of the variables fPt; Dt;Wt; Ttg1t=0, which are beyond their con-
trol, but agents are internally rationalin the sense of Adam and Marcet (2011), i.e., behave
optimally given their beliefs about exogenous variables.
We consider linear transaction taxes because they are most easily implemented in prac-
tice. In addition, non-linear transaction taxes would create incentives to either partition
trades into smaller increments or bundle trades of several investors into larger packages, so
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as to economize on transaction costs. The resulting tax rate would e¤ectively be linear again.
To simplify the analysis, we also assume that transaction taxes paid by investors of type i
are rebated in the same period in a lump sum fashion, i.e.,
T it = 
(Sit   Sit 1)Pt ; (3)
where Sit and S
i
t 1 on the r.h.s. of the previous equation denote the choices of the represen-
tative investor of type i.17 We thereby eliminate the income e¤ects associated with raising
transaction taxes.18 We have also considered the case without tax rebates and appendix A5.
shows that the main quantitative result are robust to assuming instead that taxes are not
rebated to investors (T it  0 for all t; i).
The exogenous wage and dividend processes take the form considered previously in Adam,
Marcet and Beutel (2015), with dividends evolving according to
lnDt = ln 
D + lnDt 1 + ln "Dt ; (4)
where D  1 denotes the mean growth rate of dividends and, ln "Dt an i.i.d. growth innova-
tion described further below. The wage income process Wt is chosen such that the resulting
aggregate consumption process Ct = Wt + Dt is empirically appealing.19 In particular, we
assume
lnWt = ln + lnDt + ln "
W
t ; (5)
where 
ln "Dt
ln "Wt
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which implies E"Dt = E"
W
t = 1.
Substituting the constraint into the objective function and dividing the objective function
by D1 0 , the investors problem can be written as
max
fSitg1t=0
EP
i
0
1X
t=0
t

Dt
D0
1  Sit 1  PtDt + 1+ Wt+T itDt     (Sit Sit 1)PtDt   Sit PtDt1 
1  
s:t: : Si 1 given (7)
17Agentsfully understand that what matters for tax rebates is the trading decision of the representative
investor of type i and not their own decision.
18Alternative assumptions, e.g., a rebate that is identical across investors at each point in time, would
make rebates dependent on the whole distribution of trades in equilibrium and thus on the distribution of
investorsbeliefs. This would add many additional state variables into investorsdecision problem.
19For further details, we refer the reader to Adam, Marcet and Beutel (2015), section 4.
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Due to the linear transaction cost specication, the preceding optimization problem fails to
be di¤erentiable. We explain in section 4.1. how we deal with this di¢ culty.
Subjective Beliefs. To complete the description of the investment problem we now
specify investorssubjective probability measure P i. We rst assume that agents know the
processes (4) and (5), i.e., hold rational dividend and wage expectations.20 In a second step,
we seek to specify subjective price beliefs in a way that allows us to capture the extrapolative
nature of price expectations, as implied by survey data. In particular, following Adam,
Marcet and Beutel (2015), we set up a belief system for prices that leads to expectation
dynamics of the kind described by equation (1), which captures the empirical behavior
of survey expectations. To this end, we endow agents with a belief system that allows
for persistent deviations of the growth rate of prices from the growth rate of dividends.
Specically, we assume that agent is perceived law of motion of prices is given by
lnPt+1   lnPt = ln it+1 + ln "1;it+2 + ln "2;it+1; (8)
where "1;it+2; "
2;i
t+1 denote (not directly observable) transitory shocks to price growth and 
i
t+1
a persistent price growth component that slowly drifts over time according to
ln it+1 = ln 
i
t + ln 
i
t+1; (9)
and where the persistent component of price growth ln it+1 is also unobserved. The setup just
described can capture periods with sustained increases in the price dividend ratio (it+1 >
D), as well as periods with sustained decreases (it+1 < 
D). The perceived innovations
ln "1;it+2; ln "
2;i
t+1 and ln v
i
t+1 are assumed to be jointly normally distributed according to0B@ ln "
1;i
t+2
ln "2;it+1
ln it+1
1CA  iiN
0BB@
0BB@  
2";1
2
 2";2
2
  (iv)2
2
1CCA ;
0B@ 
2
";1 0 0
0 2";2 0
0 0 i
2
1CA
1CCA ; (10)
where the variances 2";1, 
2
";2 of the transitory components are identical for all agents. We
allow the perceived variance of the innovation to the persistent component (i
2) to di¤er
across investors, so as to be able to capture the di¤erent responsiveness of survey expectations
to realized price growth rates, as documented in section 3.3..
20This is motivated by the fact that wihtin the present setting with time separable preferences, (reasonable
amounts of) extrapolation of wage and dividend beliefs would add very little to price volatility. This holds
true for models with rational price expectations, as discussed in section 2 in Adam, Marcet and Beutel
(2015), but also for models with subjective price beliefs, see for example section V.A in Adam, Marcet and
Nicolini (2015).
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The previous setup denes an optimal ltering problem for agents, in which they need to
decompose observed price growth (lnPt+1   lnPt) into its persistent and transitory compo-
nents (ln it+1 and ln "
1;i
t+2+ ln "
2;i
t+1, respectively). In the special case, that the two transitory
shock components are both unobserved and can thus be combined to ln "it = ln "
1;i
t+1 + ln "
2;i
t
with variance 2" = 
2
";1 + 
2
";2, Adam, Marcet and Beutel (2015) show, that under the as-
sumption of a normal prior with variance equal to its Kalman lter steady state value, price
growth beliefs can be summarized by a single state variable mit that evolves according to
lnmit = lnm
i
t 1  
(iv)
2
2
+ gi

lnPt   lnPt 1 + (
i
")
2 + (iv)
2
2
  lnmit 1

(11)
gi =
(i)2
2"
; (12)
where
(i)2 
 (i)2 +
q
((i)
2)2 + 4(i)
22"
2
is the Kalman lter steady state variance. The state variable lnmit describes the mean of ln 
i
t
conditional on the information available at time t, i.e., ln it is conditionally N(lnm
i
t; (
i)2)-
distributed, which implies
EP
i
t

Pt+1
Pt

= mite
(i)2=2:
This previous result, together with equation (11) shows that optimal belief updating delivers
- up to a log-exponential transformation - the updating equation (1) considered in the em-
pirical section. Moreover, equation (12) shows that the optimal updating parameter gi is a
positive function of the variance (i)
2, which allows us to replicate the empirically observed
heterogeneity in the belief updating equations.
To avoid simultaneity between prices and price beliefs, which may give rise to multiple
market clearing price and price belief pairs, we shall rely on a slightly modied information
structure, where agents observe ln "1;it as part of their time t information set. Adam, Marcet
and Beutel (2015) show how such a modied information structure gives rise to an updating
equation of the form
lnmit = lnm
i
t 1 + g
i
 
lnPt 1   lnPt 2   lnmit 1
  g ln "1;it ; (13)
which has lagged price growth enter.21
21Price growth expectations are then given by EP
i
t [Pt+1=Pt] = m
i
t.
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To complete the description of the belief system, we need to specify investorsbeliefs
about the behavior of the lump sum tax rebate T it . We shall assume that agents understand
that the tax rebates do not depend on their own decision, instead on the choices of the
representative investor of the same type i. Moreover, we assume that agents know the tax
rebate function (3).22
Market Clearing. The stock market clearing condition is given by
IX
i=1
Siti = 1 + ut;
where the left-hand side denotes total stock demand by investors of all types and the right-
hand side total stock supply. We incorporate a small exogenous stochastic component ut into
stock supply, which we assume to be white noise, uniformly distributed and to have support
[ u; u] for some u > 0 su¢ ciently close to zero. Stock supply shocks ut thereby capture the
issuance of new stocks and stock repurchases by rms.23 We add these shocks because linear
nancial transaction taxes lead to piecewise price-insensitive demand curves, which can give
rise to equilibrium price indeterminacy in the absence of supply shocks. In our numerical
applications, we make sure that u is su¢ ciently small such that it has no noticeable e¤ects
on the outcomes that emerge in the absence of a nancial transaction tax. For the case with
transaction taxes, the supply shock e¤ectively only selects the equilibrium price whenever
price-insenstitive demand curve may create the potential for price indeterminacy.
4.1. Solution Approach
This section explains how one can solve for the optimal solution of the non-di¤erentiable
problem (7). The approach we pursue consists of dening an alternative optimization prob-
lem with a di¤erentiable transaction cost specication, so that a standard solution approach
based on rst order conditions can be applied. The alternative problem has the property
that all choices that are feasible in the original problem are also feasible in the alternative
problem. Therefore, if the optimal solution to the di¤erentiable problem is a feasible choice
in (7), then it must also solve (7).
22This assumption considerably simplies the analysis: since in equilibrium individual actions coincide with
those of the representative investor of the same type, we do not need to incorporate any additional state
variables that characterize the future evolution of lump sum taxes, when writing a recursive representation
of the agentsdecision problem.
23Alternatively, they capture changes to asset oat, as discussed in Ofek and Richardson (2003) and Hong,
Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006).
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The alternative problem we consider is
max
fSitg1t=0
EP
i
0
1X
t=0
t

Dt
D0
1  Sit 1  PtDt + 1+ Wt+T itDt    it (Sit Sit 1)PtDt   Sit PtDt1 
1  
s:t: : Si 1 given (14)
where  it 2 [  ;  ] denotes a state-contingent but fully linear transaction tax/subsidy and
where T it is given by (3). Problem (14) is di¤erentiable and can be solved in a standard way
using rst-order conditions. Moreover, since  it 2 [  ;  ], all stockholding plans that are
feasible in the original problem (7) continue to be feasible in the alternative problem (14).
Suppose that the state-contingent transactions cost function  it and the associated optimal
stockholding plan

Si;optt
	1
t=0
solving (14) jointly satisfy for all t  0 the following property
 it =  at contingencies where S
i;opt
t > S
i;opt
t 1
 it =   at contingencies where Si;optt < Si;optt 1
 it 2 [  ;  ] at contingencies where Si;optt = Si;optt 1 ,
(15)
then

Si;optt
	1
t=0
is also feasible in the original problem (7) and thus the solution to (7). The
task of solving the original non-di¤erentiable problem (7) is thus equivalent to nding a
state contingent tax function  it such that condition (15) holds for the optimal solution of
the alternative di¤erentiable problem (14).
For a given f itg1t=0 the solution to (14) is characterized by the rst order condition
Ct
Dt
 
(1 +  it)
Pt
Dt
= EPt

Ct+1
Dt+1
  
Dt+1
Dt
1  
Pt+1
Dt+1
(1 +  it+1) + 1

(16)
As noted above, investor is subjective beliefs can be summarized by the recursively evolving
state variable mit. Provided the state contingency of the tax function can be expressed in the
form  it = 
i(Sit 1;
Pt
Dt
; Wt
Dt
;mit), where the arguments in the function should be interpreted as
the choices and beliefs of the representative agent of type i, the optimal stock holding policy
then also has a recursive representation of the form St = Si(Sit 1;
Pt
Dt
; Wt
Dt
;mit), by the same
arguments as put forward in Adam, Marcet and Beutel (2015).24 ;25
Our numerical solution routines, which are described in appendix A2. simultaneously
solve for the functions  i() and Si() that jointly satisfy equations (15) and (16). Numerically
24The fact that the transaction costs are linear and that under the stated assumptions the tax rebate T i
is a function of the same state variables is key for this result.
25The fact that  it depends on S
i
t 1 is just a convenient way to summarize dependence of the tax function
on past values of Pt; Dt and Wt. It does not mean that the agent thinks that  it depends on its own choices,
in fact, as should be clear from the rst order condition (16), the agent takes  it as exogenously given.
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solving for the optimal solution is computationally costly. Despite extensive reliance on
parallelization, the numerical computation of the solution and the evaluation of the Euler
errors takes around 30 hours of computing time.
5. Outcomes under Objective Price Beliefs
Before presenting the model outcome under subjective price beliefs, this section briey
discusses the model predictions for the case where agents hold rational price expectations.
With objective price beliefs and with investors holding identical initial stock endowments,
di¤erences between investor types disappear. The model then reduces to a representative
agent rational expectations model with time separable preferences. As shown in Adam,
Marcet and Beutel (2015), the pricing implications of the model then display a well-known
set of shortcomings. The standard deviation of the price dividend ratio, for instance, is one
order of magnitude below that observed in the data and displays virtually no persistence
over time. The model thus fails to replicate the large and protracted run-ups and reversals
that can be observed for the PD ratio in U.S. data. The model also fails to replicate the
positive correlation between the PD ratio and expected returns, as evidenced in survey
data. Finally, with rational price expectations, the model does not give rise to trade in
equilibrium, thus cannot be related to the documented facts on trading activity. As we show
in the next section, model performance strongly improves, once one incorporates the kind of
extrapolative behavior documented in survey data.
6. Quantitative Model Performance
This section evaluates the quantitative performance of our asset pricing model in the
absence of FTTs with subjective price beliefs given by equations (8) and (9). Performance
is evaluated in terms of the ability to match the stylized facts presented in section 3.. The
e¤ects of introducing FTTs will be studied in section 8..
We parameterize our model using the model parameters employed in Adam, Marcet and
Beutel (2015), which are summarized in table 5. Table 5 also lists the value for the support of
stock supply shocks, which is a new parameter and set such that the amount of trade caused
by these shocks amounts to less than 0.3% of the average trading volume in a setting without
FTTs. Since trading volume is only weakly a¤ected for the considered range of FTTs, the
same holds approximately true for the case with FTTs. Furthermore, we verify that in the
absence of FTTs, stock supply shocks a¤ect the model moments in almost non-noticable
ways.
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Motivated by the evidence in table 4, we consider a model with 5 agent types, each of
which has mass 1/5, and assign to them the point estimates of the updating gains from table
4.26
[Table 5 about here]
Table 6 compares the model generated moments in the absence of FTTs to those in the
data.27 The model moments for our baseline calibration are reported in the third column,
while the fourth column reports the associated t-ratios for each considered moment.28 Over-
all, our asset pricing model does a good job in replicating the pure stock price moments,
i.e., the rst ve moments reported in the table. It matches particularly well the mean
and autocorrelation of the PD ratio, as well as the mean of quarterly real stock returns. It
produces, however, too much volatility for the PD ratio and for returns. The model also
does a good job in capturing the observed high positive correlation between the PD ratio
and average return expectations in the survey data (corr(PDt; EtRt+1)).
Regarding the newly added moments, the model generates a high positive autocorrelation
in trading volume (corr(TVt; TVt 1)), albeit the model correlation is too high relative to the
one found in the data. The model also manages to quantitatively capture the positive
correlation between trading volume and absolute price changes (corr(TVt; jPt=Pt 1   1j)).
When looking at the correlation between trading volume and the PD ratio (corr(TVt; PDt)),
the model produces a fairly weak positive correlation, but one that is stronger than in the
data. The model also generates a positive correlation between trading volume and cross
sectional dispersion of return expectations (corr(TVt; std( eEitRt+1))), but again overstates
this correlation relative to the data.29 The latter should not be surprising, given that in our
simple model belief dispersion is the only reason why agents want to trade.
Since the baseline model produces an anti-puzzlein the form of too much stock price
volatility relative to the data, we also consider a model version in which we dampen the
26Recall that we chose the experience groups in table 4 so as to have approximately the same number of
investors in each group.
27All simulation results are based on 100.000 quarters of simulated data, where the rst 10.000 quarters
are considered as a burn-in and discarded when calculating model moments. Also, to make results from
di¤erent simulations more comparable, we use xed sequences for the exogenous driving processes (wages,
dividends, stock supply shocks).
28The t-ratio is based on an estimate of the standard deviation of the data moment as a measure of
uncertainty, where we estimate the standard deviation of the moment in the data using standard procedures,
as described - for example - in Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2015).
29The data moment reported in table 6 is the one pertaining to the UBS survey, which has also been used
to compute corr(PDt; EtRt+1) in the data.
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extrapolative component in belief updating. This is motivated by the fact that the updating
gains in table 4 are themselves estimated with uncertainty. Specically, we reduce the point
estimates from table 4 by 2.5 times the estimated standard deviation of the point estimate30,
leaving all other parameters unchanged. The resulting model moments are reported in the
second to last column in table 6 below, with the last column reporting the associated t-ratios.
Price and return volatility are now in line with data, while all other moments remain largely
una¤ected.
Overall, we nd that the model does a good job in quantitatively replicating the joint
behavior of stock price, trading volume and price expectations.
[Table 6 about here]
7. Asset Price Booms and their Implications
This section illustrates that stock prices in the model occasionally embark on a self-
sustaining asset price boom and bust cycle. Unlike in the representative agent model of
Adam, Marcet and Beutel (2015), such cycles have large welfare implications for di¤erent
agent types.
[Figure 3 about here]
To illustrate the potential of the model to generate boom-bust cycles and to compute
the welfare implications of such cycles, we conduct a simple controlled experiment using the
baseline model from the previous section: we x agentsinitial stockholdings and initial beliefs
at their ergodic sample means; we then shock the economy with n positive dividend growth
shocks of a two standard deviation size. Such or larger positive dividend shocks occur with
a probability of about 2.5% per quarter. We shut down all other shocks, including dividend
growth shocks after period n. We begin the experiment with n = 1 and successively increase
n until we obtain a stock price boom and bust cycle from period n + 1 onwards. Figure
3 depicts - for di¤erent values of n - the equilibrium outcomes for the PD ratio. While
the PD ratio reacts very little to the positive news for n  3 (stock prices, however, do
react to the positive dividend news), one obtains for n = 4 a very large stock price boom
30We use for each gain parameter the gain specic standard deviation reported in the last row of table 4.
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and a subsequent price bust.31 The economic forces driving the boom and bust dynamics
are explained in detail in Adam, Marcet and Beutel (2015). Here, we only note that the
boom results from the fact that agents - having observed price increases - become optimistic
about future price growth and eventually bid up stock prices by su¢ cient amounts, so that
price increases and increasing optimism mutually reinforce each other. This e¤ect is set in
motion whenever a su¢ cient number of positive fundamental shocks, e.g., dividend growth
shocks, occurs. The boom comes to an end, when agentsincreased wealth leads them to
eventually increase consumption demand, so that stock demand ceases to increase further
with increased optimism. Prices then stagnate, which means that they fail to fulll the high
expectations of agents. Agents then revise beliefs downwards and set in motion a price bust.
The bust causes a temporary undershooting of the PD ratio below its ergodic mean, but
prices eventually return close to their ergodic mean absent further shocks, see gure 3.
[Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 depicts the PD ratio (top panel) together with agents equilibrium trading
decisions (middle panel) and return expectations (bottom panel) for the boom-bust episode
triggered by four positive dividend growth shocks. To increase readability of the graph, we
only report the trading patterns and return expectations of agents with the highest and
lowest updating gain parameters.32 In the UBS survey, high gains were estimated for agents
with few years of stock market experience, while the most experienced group displayed a low
updating gain. For this reason we refer to agents with a high (low) gain as inexperienced
(experienced) agents.
Figure 4 shows that in the initial phase of the stock price boom, inexperienced agents
do rather well. They start buying stocks early on and well before prices approach their
peak value. Experienced investors sell assets during the boom phase, i.e., much too early.
Yet, once the PD ratio is high, inexperienced investors are much more optimistic about
future returns than experienced investors, see the bottom panel. As a result, inexperienced
investors continue buying stocks from low gain types at high prices (relative to dividends).
Also, inexperienced investors continue buying during much of the price bust phase and only
sell in signicant amounts once the PD ratio started undershooting its long-run mean. Thus,
even though inexperienced investors are doing well initially, this fails to be the case over the
entire boom-bust cycle.
31Increasing n further would lead to very similar boom-bust dynamics as for the case with n = 4.
32Agents types with intermediate updating gain values take intermediate decisions that are in between
those shown in the gure.
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To gauge the welfare e¤ects of a boom-bust episode, we compare the outcome in gure 4
to a situation in which the same shocks occur, but where agents hold their beliefs constant
at the initial value, i.e., do not respond to the price movements triggered by the dividend
growth shocks, so that there is no asset price boom. We can then compute the permanent
proportional consumption variation that would make (ex-post realized) utility in the setting
with constant beliefs and without an asset price boom identical to the (ex-post realized)
utility in the setting with the asset price boom shown in gure 4. Outcomes are reported in
table 7, which shows that asset price booms are extremely costly for inexperienced agents and
extremely benecial for experienced investors: the welfare equivalent consumption variations
of a boom-bust episode amount to a permanent change in consumption of several percentage
points.
[Table 7 about here]
8. The E¤ects of Financial Transaction Taxes
We now consider the implications of introducing linear nancial transaction taxes, focus-
ing on the implication of FTTs for the behavior of asset pricing moments, the patterns of
boom-bust dynamics and trading volume.
Table 8 reports how the asset pricing moments from the baseline model in table 6 are
a¤ected by various tax rates. The main e¤ect of nancial transaction taxes consists of
increasing asset price volatility, as measured by the standard deviation of quarterly stock
returns (std(rs)) and the standard deviation of the PD ratio (std(PD)).33 Except for the
reduced correlation between trading volume and prices (corr(TVt; PDt), corr(TVt; jPt=Pt 1 
1j)), the remaining asset pricing moments from table 6 prove to be rather robust towards
the introduction of FTTs.
The last four rows in table 8 report a number of additional statistics about asset price
boom-bust episodes and trading volume. These statistics allow to asses in greater detail
why asset price volatility increases with the introduction of FTTs. The fourth to last row
in table 8, for example, reports the number of asset price boom episodes per 100 years of
simulated data, where we dene the beginning of a boom as the rst time in which the
quarterly PD ratio exceeds a level of 250 and the end of a boom as the rst time it falls
33For very high tax rates (10%) the volatility of the PD ratio starts to fall, while return volatility continues
to increase. We discuss this issue further below.
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below 200 thereafter.34 The results in the table show that the number of stock price booms
is monotonically increasing in the FTTs, with boom-bust episodes becoming about a third
more likely relative to the case without transaction taxes when the tax rate reaches 4%.
The third and second to last rows in table 8 display, respectively, information about the
length of the boom episodes and the average peak value of the PD reached during these
episodes. It shows that booms tend to become shorter lived and somewhat less pronounced
as the tax rate rises, but these e¤ects are not very strong for tax rates up to 4%. As a result,
the e¤ect of an increased number of booms dominates and the standard deviation of the PD
ratio increases with the tax rate. For a 10% tax rate, the decrease in the peak level of the
PD during booms and the reduced length of stock price booms start to dominate, causing
the standard deviation of the PD ratio to decreases, even if the standard deviation of returns
still increases.
Somewhat surprisingly, the average trading volume (relative to the case without FTTs)
tends to increase with the level of FTTs. As we discuss further below, this occurs because
there is more trade during booms times, as belief disagreements are then larger, and because
booms become more likely with the introduction of FTTs.
[Table 8 about here]
Table 9 reports the welfare implications associated with introducing di¤erent tax rates.
Starting from the ergodic mean for stock holdings and beliefs in the no-tax economy, the table
reports the welfare equivalent permanent consumption variation that would make di¤erent
agent types in the economy with taxes as well-o¤ in expected terms as in the economy
without taxes.35 Table 9 clearly shows that agents that extrapolate more, i.e., inexperienced
investors in our survey sample, tend to lose, while more experienced investors tend to win
in expected terms.36 For all agent types, except the median type, whose utility is largely
una¤ected by the tax rate, the gains and losses monotonically increase with the tax rate.
Wealth redistribution between investors thus increases with the tax rate.
[Table 9 about here]
34The reported numbers are very robust to choosing di¤erent thresholds because boom-bust episodes are
periods in which prices display a clearly distinct behavior.
35We use objective probabilities to compute agentsexpected utility.
36The welfare e¤ects in table 9 are smaller than those reported in table 7. The latter reports the e¤ects
of a single stock price boom episode relative to the counterfactual outcome without a boom. Since booms
are (in expected terms) not likely to occur within the immediate future, when starting the simulation at the
ergodic mean, the welfare e¤ects in table 9 are not as large as those reported in table 7.
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Table 10 provides additional insights by reporting asset price moments conditional on
being in a boom period, as dened above, and conditional on being in normal times, i.e.,
periods that are not identied as boom periods. Clearly, the PD ratio is considerably higher
during boom times and so is the standard deviation of the PD ratio. Mean quarterly stock
returns during boom periods are considerably higher than in normal times, but stock returns
also display a considerably larger standard deviation. Furthermore, while the introduction of
FTTs reduces the volatility of the PD ratio and returns during boom periods, FTTs increase
both of these standard deviations during normal times. As we show below, it is precisely the
increase in volatility during normal times coupled with extrapolative behavior which causes
stock price booms to become more likely.
Table 10 shows that trading volume decreases with the size of the FTT during boom pe-
riods, but - somewhat paradoxically - increases during normal times. Upon closer inspection,
we nd that for tax rates up to 4% the increase in trading volume during normal times is
purely driven by post-boom trading activity. As can be seen from gure 4, trading activity
stays high long after the PD ratio returned to values below 200. Once one removes these
post-boom periods from the normal times, trading volume is actually decreasing with the
FTTs in normal times.37
[Table 10 about here]
To illustrate further how FTTs increase the likelihood of boom-bust cycles, we now per-
form a similar experiment as carried out in section 7. for the case without a tax. Specically,
we consider the model with a FTT of 4% and x initial stockholdings and initial beliefs
at their ergodic sample means. We then shock the economy with n  0 positive dividend
growth shocks of two standard deviations. Yet, this time we continue to let the small exoge-
nous stock supply shocks operate at all times. These shocks are themselves not enough to
generate stock price booms, but can do so in combination with dividend shocks.
[Figures 5 and 6 about here]
Figure 5 depicts the probability that the economy embarks on a stock price boom as a
function of the number of dividend growth shocks, integrating over possible realizations of the
37The situation is di¤erent for very high tax rates (10%). Trading activity then increases also during normal
times, even when excluding post-boom periods. This occurs because the large increase in price volatility
leads to an amount of belief disagreement and thus trade in normal times, which more than compensates
the trade-reducing e¤ect of the tax.
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stock supply shocks.38 For the case without a FTT, booms start to emerge once n increases
above 4.39 The situation di¤ers for the case with a 4% FTT, where fewer fundamental shocks
are required to start a boom episode. For n  1, the economy never embarks on a stock
price boom, but for n = 2 stock price booms emerge in more than 60% of the cases and
for n  3 virtually always. This shows that booms become more likely in a situation with
FTTs, as fewer fundamental shocks are required to set it in motion.
Figure 6 illustrates the driving force giving rise to this outcome. The gure depicts the
stock demand function for a 4% FTT.40 It shows that around the level of prior stockholding
(assumed to be equal to one), stock demand (shown on the vertical axis) is not sensitive
to the stock price (shown on the horizontal axis). This price insensitivity of stock demand
covers a considerable price range and is actually increasing with the tax rate.41 Therefore, in
the presence of FTTs, even very small exogenous variations in stock supply can lead to large
movements in realized prices, explaining why prices become more volatile during normal
times. Since agents use realized price growth to update price expectations, FTTs increase
the likelihood that stock prices embark on a belief-driven stock price boom.
9. State-Contingent Financial Transaction Taxes
Motivated by the results in the previous section, this section considers the e¤ects of
introducing state-contingent transaction taxes that are only levied once the PD ratio exceeds
a certain (su¢ ciently high) threshold value PD. The idea behind such a state-contingent tax
is that it avoids the increase in price volatility during normal times, thereby avoiding that
the stock market embarks with higher likelihood on a boom-bust cycle, while potentially
limiting the duration and extent of stock price booms once they have taken hold.
Specically, consider a setting with linear transaction taxes  > 0, which are levied only if
PDt  PD, and zero taxes otherwise. We set the threshold value PD equal to 250, which is
the value used to identify the beginning of a stock price boom episodes in previous sections.
After solving for the optimal stock demand functions42, it turns out that state-contingent
38As before, we dene a boom as a stituation where the PD ratio subsequently increases above 250 at
some point. We consider up to 12 quarters after the last dividend shock. Results prove very robust to
choosing di¤erent thresholds and period limits. Probabilities are computed from averaging the outcome of
500 stochastic realizations.
39Since we now let stock supply shocks also operate in the case without a tax, this shows that the ndings
of gure 3 are robust to the introduction of the stock supply shock.
40The gure assumes  = 4% and the following values for the state variables: Wt=Dt = , mt = 
D, and
S 1 = 1.
41Appendix A3. explains how one can accurately determine the inaction regions.
42The solution strategy outlined in section 4.1. for the case with a non-state contingent tax can then still
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taxes lead to problems of non-existence of equilibrium prices, as well as to the possibility of
equilibrium multiplicities.
The non-existence problem is illustrated in gure 7, which depicts the excess stock de-
mand (on the vertical axis) as a function of the price dividend ratio (horizontal axis). The
gure depicts these functions for all agent types, as well as the aggregate excess demand
function.43
Figure 7 shows that once the PD ratio exceeds its critical value PD, agents want to buy
or sell less stocks, i.e., the excess demand functions discontinuously jump to a value closer
to the no trade line (the zero line). As a result, the aggregate excess demand function also
has a jump at PD = PD and for the case depicted in gure 7, this leads to non-existence
of an equilibrium price: the excess demand function is strictly positive for PD < PD but
strictly negative for PD  PD.
Obviously, the jump in the aggregate excess stock demand function does not necessarily
have to be of the kind shown in gure 7. We also encountered cases in which there was
an upward jump at the critical value PD. This can happen whenever agents who seek
to sell stocks respond more to the tax once its levied than agents who want to purchase
stocks. Figure 8 depicts an example, where the aggregate excess demand jumps upwards
at PD = PD. As the gure illustrates, this can give rise to multiple market clearing
equilibrium prices. Since realized prices feed into agentsprice beliefs, price multiplicities
have the potential to signicantly increase price volatility.
While the non-existence problem could possibly be overcome by introducing taxes that
are a continuous function of the PD ratio, the multiplicity issue is harder to address. One
would have to design state-contingent taxes in such a way that aggregate stock excess demand
functions are never upward sloping in the vicinity of the zero point. It is unclear which tax
design would be able to achieve this outcome.
[Figure 7 and 8 about here]
be applied because the tax function  i(Sit 1;
Pt
Dt
; WtDt ;m
i
t) derived in section 4.1. can already depend on the
PD ratio. Instead of satisfying equations (15) and (16), the tax function and the stock holding policy must
now jointly satisfy the rst order condition (16) and
 it =  at contingencies where S
i;opt
t > S
i;opt
t 1 and PD  PD
 it =   at contingencies where Si;optt < Si;optt 1 and PD  PD
 it 2 [  ;  ] at contingencies where Si;optt = Si;optt 1 and PD  PD
 it = 0 otherwise,
so as to be feasible in the original problem with a non-di¤erentiable tax function (above the PD threshold).
43To illustrate the e¤ects in the most transparent way, we use the setting with a 10% transaction tax, but
the e¤ects are qualitatively the same for lower tax rates.
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10. Conclusions
We present a quantitatively credible asset pricing model in which stock prices display
occasional boom and bust cycles in valuation, which redistribute large amounts of wealth
between di¤erent investor types. We show how the introduction of nancial transactions
taxes increases price volatility during normal times and thereby the likelihood that the
stock market embarks on a belief-driven boom and bust cycle. State-contingent transaction
taxes, which seek to avoid the increase in price volatility during normal times, generate
problems via equilibrium multiplicities and non-existence. Taken together, these ndings
cast serious doubts on whether nancial transaction taxes can fruitfully contribute towards
increasing the e¢ ciency of stock market prices and transactions.
A key channel highlighted by the present framework is that empirically plausible degrees
of extrapolation by investors make it important that market interventions do not increase
stock price volatility during normal times, i.e., outside boom-bust episodes. Throughout the
analysis, we have taken the degree of extrapolation as given. Conceivably, market interven-
tions can also have a direct e¤ect on the degree to which investors extrapolate past capital
gains. To the extent that FTTs reduce extrapolation, FTTs can generate additional benets
that are not captured within the present analysis and may overturn our results. Obviously,
if FTTs give rise to more extrapolation, they generate additional costs and strengthen the
point made in the present paper. Empirically investigating the e¤ects of FTTs on the degree
of investor extrapolation thus appears to be an interesting avenue for future research.
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A Appendix
A1. Data sources
Stock price data: Our stock price data is for the United States and has been downloaded
from The Global Financial Database.44 The period covered is Q1:1949-Q1:2012. The
nominal stock price series is the "SP 500 Composite Price Index (w/GFD extension)"
(Global Fin code "_SPXD"). The daily series has been transformed into quarterly data
by taking the index value of the last day of the considered quarter. To obtain real values,
nominal variables have been deated using the USA BLS Consumer Price Index(Global
Fin code CPUSAM). The monthly price series has been transformed into a quarterly series
by taking the index value of the last month of the considered quarter. Nominal dividends
have been computed as follows
Dt =

ID(t)=ID(t  1)
IND(t)=IND(t  1)   1

IND(t)
where IND denotes the "SP 500 Composite Price Index (w/GFD extension)"described
above and ID is the "SP 500 Total Return Index (w/GFD extension)"(Global Fin code
"_SPXTRD"), which contains returns from price changes and dividend payouts. In the
notation of our model, ID(t) is equal to Pt and IND(t)=IND(t 1) equal to (Pt+Dt)=Pt 1.We
rst computed monthly dividends and then quarterly dividends by adding up the monthly
series. Following Campbell (2003), dividends have been deseasonalized by taking averages
of the actual dividend payments over the current and preceding three quarters.
Stock market survey data: The UBS survey is the UBS Index of Investor Optimism.45
For all our calculations we use own portfolio return expectations from 1999:Q1 to 2007:Q2.
We do not use data from 1998 due to missing values. The micro dataset of the UBS survey
consists of 92823 record. Data-cleaning results in the removal of 18379 this records: Fol-
lowing Vissing-Jorgensen (2003), we ignore survey responses with stated expected returns
larger than 95% in absolute value, which results in the elimination of 16380 observations.
Furthermore, we ignore records, where the di¤erence between the respondents age and his
stated stock market experience is less than 16 years, which eliminates 2378.46
The Shiller survey covers individual investors and has been kindly made available to us
by Robert Shiller at Yale University. The survey spans the period 1999:Q1-2012:Q4. The
44It is available at http://www.globalnancialdata.com.
45See http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/data/datasets/ubs_investor.html.
46The two numbers do not add up to 18379, since some records satisfy both criteria for elimination.
Can a Financial Transaction Tax Prevent Stock Price Booms? 29
CFO survey is collected by Duke University and CFO magazine and collects responses from
about 450 CFOs. The data span the period 2000:Q3-2012:Q4.
Ination expectations data: The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is available
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Trading volume: We have daily data from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream
from 2nd January 1973 until 31st March 2014. We look at the series "US-DS Market"
(TOTMKUS), an index of 1000 U.S. stocks traded on NYSE and Nasdaq.
We compute quarterly trading volume as follows: Starting from daily trading volume
(DS: VA) and daily market value (DS: MV) we compute daily trading volume (VA/MV), i.e.
the share of the market that is traded on each day. We then aggregate this up, following Lo
and Wang (2009), by summing the shares over all trading days in the quarter, thus arriving
at the share of the market that is traded in a particular quarter up to the last trading day
of the quarter (end of March, June, September, December). Thus volume is measured over
the same time period where expectations are measured. Moreover, end of quarter PDs are
associated with the trading volume accumulated in the preceding 3 months.
A2. Numerical solution approach
We now describe the solution strategy for determining the functions Si() and  i() and
the associated lump sum rebate T i(). To simplify notation we drop all i superscripts. Also,
instead of solving for the optimal stockholding function S(), we solve in our numerical
approach for the optimal consumption dividend ratio Ct=Dt = CD(St 1; PtDt ;
Wt
Dt
;mt). There
is a one-to-one mapping between the S () policy and the CD () policy due to the ow budget
constraint, which implies
Ct
Dt
= St 1

Pt
Dt
+ 1

+
Wt + Tt
Dt
   t(St   St 1) Pt
Dt
  St Pt
Dt
;
and due to the assumption that  t = (St 1; PtDt ;
Wt
Dt
;mit) and Tt=Dt =  j(St   St 1)Pt=Dtj.
We solve the rst order condition by combining time iteration with an endogenous grid
point method, thereby avoiding any root nding steps in the solution procedure. This
considerably speeds up the numerical solution. We now describe this procedure in detail.
We start with a guess for the future consumption policy CD(j)(), the transactions tax
function  (j)() and the lump sum rebate relative to dividends TD(j)() = T j()=Dt, where
the superscript (j) denotes the j-th guess in the time iteration procedure and where all
functions depend on the arguments (St 1; PtDt ;
Wt
Dt
;mt):
Given the guesses CD(j)(),  (j)() and TD(j) () and given an alternative grid of current
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values (St; PtDt ;
Wt
Dt
;mt) - note this alternative grid contains St not St 1 - we can compute the
updated consumption policygCD(j+1)(St; PtDt ; WtDt ;mt) and the updated marginal tax functione (j+1), which are both dened over the alternative grid, by iterating on the FOC (16). In
particular, equation (16) implies
gCD(j+1)  (1 + e (j+1)t ) = EPt
 
CD(j)
  Dt+1
Dt
1  
Pt+1
Dt+1
(1 + 
(j)
t+1) + 1

Pt=Dt
(17)
Given any point (St; PtDt ;
Wt
Dt
;mt) on the alternative grid, we can compute the distribution
over future (standard) grid points (St;
Pt+1
Dt+1
; Wt+1
Dt+1
;mt+1), using the perceived evolution over
prices, dividends, wages and beliefs. Together with the guesses CD(j)() and  (j), this allows
evaluating the r.h.s. of (17) using a standard numerical integration method (we use deter-
ministic integration based on quadrature points). For future reference, let M(St; PtDt ;
Wt
Dt
;mt)
denote the value of the r.h.s. of (17). The l.h.s. of equation (17) then implies that we have
also determined the value of the product (Ct=Dt)1 (1   t), at every alternative grid point.
It now remains to compute the updated functions CD(j+1),  (j+1)t and TD
(j+1) which are
dened over the standard grid (St 1; PtDt ;
Wt
Dt
;mt). We do so by xing an arbitrary alternative
grid point (St ;

Pt
Dt

;

Wt
Dt

;mt ) and by checking the range of possible situations St 1 7 St .
We begin by conjecturing St 1 = St . The ow budget constraint then determines the
implied consumption dividend ratio, i.e.,
Ct
Dt
= St +

Wt
Dt

: (18)
We can then check whether the tax rate  (j+1)t associated with (18), dened as
Ct
Dt
 
(1 + 
(j+1)
t ) =M(S

t ;

Pt
Dt

;

Wt
Dt

;mt ), (19)
satises  (j+1)t 2 [  ;+ ]. If so, then we have found the optimal consumption dividend ratio
CD(j+1) and associated shadow tax rate  (j+1)t at the standard grid point

St 1 = St ;

Pt
Dt

;

Wt
Dt

;mt

.
The updated lump sum tax rebate over dividends at this gridpoint is simply TD(j+1) = 0.
If the value of  (j+1)t solving (19) satises 
(j+1)
t >  , then it must be that S

t > St 1.
47 We
therefore set  (j+1)t =  and determine the equilibrium consumption dividend ratio CD
(j+1)
47Reducing  t so that it satises  t   requires that (Ct=Dt)  increases, see the l.h.s. of equation (17).
From the ow budget constraint follows that this can only happen if St 1 decreases below St , given the
values for (Pt=Dt)
 and (Wt=Dt)
.
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from equation (17), which delivers
(CD(j+1)) (1 + ) =M(St ;

Pt
Dt

;

Wt
Dt

;mt ):
Finally, we use the budget constraint to compute the associated initial grid point St 1, which
must solve
CD(j+1) = St 1

Pt
Dt

+ 1

+

Wt
Dt

  St

Pt
Dt

; (20)
where we used the updated lump sum rebate function TD(j+1) =   (St   St 1)

Pt
Dt

. We
have thus determinedCD(j+1),  (j+1) and TD(j+1) at the grid point

St 1;

Pt
Dt

;

Wt
Dt

;mt

.
If the value of  (j+1)t solving (19) satises 
(j+1)
t <   , then we must assume St < St 1
and thus set  (j+1)t =   . Using (17) we can determine the equilibrium consumption dividend
ratio CD(j+1)
u0(CD(j+1))(1  ) =M(St ;

Pt
Dt

;

Wt
Dt

;mt ).
Again, we use the budget constraint to compute the associated grid point St 1, which must
solve
CD(j+1) = St 1

Pt
Dt

+ 1

+

Wt
Dt

  St

Pt
Dt

; (21)
where we use the updated lump sum rebate function TD(j+1) =    (St   St 1)

Pt
Dt

We perform the iterations described above until convergence of the functions CD(j) (),
 (j) () and TD(j).
A3. Inaction Regions and Adaptive Grid Point Choice
A transaction tax leads to partially at stock demand curves (inaction regions) and
thereby introduces a high degree of nonlinearity - non-di¤erentiabilities in the Pt
Dt
-dimension
- into the consumption policy function CD(j) () and the associated shadow tax  (j) ().
While linear interpolation between two grid points yields very accurate approximations of
these functions for most Pt
Dt
values, this is generally not true close to the boundaries of the
inaction regions, if these boundaries are not elements of our discretized state space.
Including the Pt
Dt
boundaries of the inaction region into the discretized state space poses
two challenges: First, the exact locations of these boundaries are not known a priori, but
depend on the optimal solution. Therefore, the Pt
Dt
grid is required to change in every
iteration. We describe in the sequel how we use an adaptive grid point choice to ensure
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that our best guess for the inaction region boundaries is always part of the Pt
Dt
grid. Second,
these boundaries are not independent of other states, but vary with (St 1; WtDt ;mt). Hence,
the Pt
Dt
grid is not only required to change in every iteration of the algorithm, but also to
be dependent on other state variables.48 We clarify below how we interpolate our policy to
states not contained in the discretized state space.
Adaptive grid points: Since the non-di¤erentiability problem only occurs in the Pt
Dt
-
dimension, we x a vector (St 1; WtDt ;mt) in the sequel. First, we observe, that the interior
of the inaction region in the Pt
Dt
-dimension can be identied by the shadow tax function
 (): The optimal consumption (or, equivalently, stock holding) policy does not change in
a neighborhood of the current value of Pt
Dt
, if and only if 

St 1; PtDt ;
Wt
Dt
;mt

2 (  ; ).
Since in such cases St 1 = St, the same relationship must hold for the function ~ dened
on the alternative "state space" (St; PtDt ;
Wt
Dt
;mt). In our solution algorithm, we solve for this
function ~ by solving equation (19) under the assumption that consumption satises the no
trade relationship (18) and set it to  , whenever its value exceeds  and to   , whenever
its value is less than   . The boundaries of the inaction region are therefore given for those
values of Pt
Dt
, for which no trade consumption dened by (18) and  (j+1)t 2 f  ; g solve
equation (19). This yields two equations
St +

Wt
Dt
 
(1 ) =M(St ;

P
D


;

Wt
Dt

;mt )
which we solve for the adapted grid points
 
P
D

 in each iteration of the above algorithm.
49
We make sure, that in our algorithm not only the functions CD(j) (),  (j) () and TD(j), but
also these adapted grid points converge. The present approach is similar to the approach
proposed in Brumm and Grill (2014). The latter cover the discretized state space with
simplices and look for just bindingconstraints on each edge of these simplices. We only
look at edges that are orthogonal to the (St 1; WtDt ;mt)-hyperplane, which is computationally
more e¢ cient within the present setup.
Interpolation: We x the set of initial grid points GS, GWD, GPD, Gm for the state
space. Our discretized state space is, however, not given by the product GSGWDGPD
48Including all inaction boundaries for any combination of (St 1; WtDt ;mt) into a common
Pt
Dt
grid creates
a computationally prohibitively large number of discretization points.
49Note, that
 
P
D

+
and
 
P
D

  are functions of ((S

t ;

Wt
Dt

;mt ), although this is suppressed in our nota-
tion.
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Gm, but instead by
GS GWD GPD Gm
[ f(S;WD;PD+(S;WD;m);m) j (S;WD;m) 2 GS GWD Gmg
[ f(S;WD;PD (S;WD;m);m) j (S;WD;m) 2 GS GWD Gmg
The standard linear interpolation method on a Cartesian product of one-dimensional grids is
therefore augmented as follows: for a given query point (Sq;WDq; PDq;mq), we rst search
for indices i; j; k, such that Sq 2 [Si; Si+1], WDq 2 [WDj;WDj+1] and mq 2 [mk;mk+1] and
then linearly interpolate the policy in the PD-dimension for each combination (S;WD;m) 2
fSi; Si+1g  fWDj;WDj+1g  fmk;mk+1g using as a PD grid the intersection of the dis-
cretized state space with the line parallel to the PD-axis that crosses (S;WD;m). This yields
eight interpolated policy values CDu;v;w with (u; v; w) 2 fi; i + 1g  fj; j + 1g  fk; k + 1g
of the function
(S;WD;m) 7! CD(S;WD;PDq;m)
at the chosen closest (S;WD;m)-grid points. We then use ordinary three-dimensional linear
interpolation to obtain the interpolated policy value for CD(Sq;WDq; PDq;mq), i.e.
CDinterp(Sq;WDq; PDq;mq)
=
X
u=i;i+1
X
v=j;j+1
X
w=k;k+1
jSq   SujjWDq  WDvjjmq  mwj
(Si+1   Si)(WDj+1  WDj)(mk+1  mk)CDu;v;w
We proceed analogously for linear extrapolation.
A4. Testing for Equality of Gain Estimates in Table 4
Table A.1 reports the p-values for the null hypothesis H0 : gi = gj for i 6= j.
[Table A.1 about here ]
A5. No Tax Rebates
Table A.2 reports the outcomes shown in table 8 in the main text for the case where tax
revenue is not rebated to investors (T it = 0 for all t,i). It shows that ndings a robust to
making this alternative assumption on tax rebates.
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[Table A.2 about here]
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U.S. Data
1949:Q1-2012:Q1
Stock prices:
E[PD] 139.7
std(PD) 65.3
corr(PDt; PDt 1) 0.98
std(rs) 8.01%
E[rs] 1.89%
Survey expectations:
corr(PDt; EtRt+1) 0.79
Dividends:
E[Dt=Dt 1   1] 0.48%
std(Dt=Dt 1) 1.92%
Table 1: Quarterly stock prices, dividends and survey expectations
Detrending Method
Baseline (linear) Linear-quadratic HP lter MA
corr(TVt; TVt 1) 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.66*** 0.43***
corr(TVt; PDt) -0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.06
corr(TVt; jPt=Pt 1   1j) 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.23***
== indicates signicance at the 10%/5%/1% signicance level, respectively.
Table 2: Trading Volume and Price Behavior
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Detrending Method
Baseline (linear) Linear-quadratic HP lter MA
UBS-Gallup Survey (1-year horizon)
corr(TVt; std( eEitRt+1)) 0.41* 0.41** 0.43* 0.17
corr(TVt; IQR( eEitRt+1)) 0.36 0.50* 0.65** 0.41**
Shiller Survey (3-months horizon)
corr(TVt; std( eEitRt+1)) 0.37* 0.40* 0.43** -0.06
corr(TVt; IQR( eEitRt+1)) 0.52** 0.54** 0.63*** 0.19
Shiller Survey (6-months horizon)
corr(TVt; std( eEitRt+1)) 0.60*** 0.60* 0.58*** 0.03
corr(TVt; IQR( eEitRt+1)) 0.43* 0.46* 0.47** 0.09
Shiller Survey (1-year horizon)
corr(TVt; std( eEitRt+1)) 0.51** 0.52** 0.51*** 0.18
corr(TVt; IQR( eEitRt+1)) 0.49** 0.55** 0.56*** 0.23
CFO Survey (1-year horizon)
corr(TVt; std( eEitRt+1)) 0.70** 0.65** 0.64*** -0.02
== indicates signicance at the 10%/5%/1% signicance level, respectively.
Table 3: Trading volume and disagreement
Experience (yrs) 0-5 6-11 12-17 18-23 > 23
Estimated gi 0.0316 0.0286 0.0264 0.0230 0.0180
(std. deviation) (0.0028) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0090)
Table 4: Estimated updating parameters
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Parameter Value Calibration Target
D 1:0048 average quarterly real dividend growth
D 0:0192 std. deviation quarterly real dividend growth
 22 average consumption-dividend ratio
DW  3:74  10 4 jointly chosen s.t. corrt(Ct=Ct 1; Dt=Dt 1) = 0:2
W 0:0197 and stdt(Ct=Ct 1) = 17stdt(Dt=Dt 1)
" 0:0816 std. deviation of quarterly real stock price growth
 0.995 average PD ratio
 2 - none -
u 1  10 5 - none -
Table 5: Model calibration
U.S. Data Baseline t-ratio Reduced t-ratio
Model Gain
(no tax) (no tax)
E[PD] 139.77 135.77 0.16 117.16 0.91
std(PD) 65.17 122.13 -3.84 92.96 -1.88
corr(PDt; PDt 1) 0.98 0.98 0.84 0.98 -0.13
std(rs) 8.00% 11.63% -9.05 8.27% -0.68
E[rs] 1.89% 2.11% -0.47 1.84% 0.11
corr(PDt; EtRt+1) 0.79 0.84 -0.78 0.84 -0.73
corr(TVt; TVt 1) 0.89 0.97 -4.29 0.97 -4.14
corr(TVt; PDt) -0.07 0.37 -5.79 0.47 -7.09
corr(TVt; jPt=Pt 1   1j) 0.34 0.25 1.12 0.28 0.78
corr(TVt; std( eEitRt+1)) 0.41 0.95 -3.67 0.92 -3.50
Table 6: Quantitative match of the asset pricing model
Gain 0.0316 0.0286 0.0264 0.0230 0.0180
Permanent cons. variation -7.01% -3.51% -1.27% 1.73% 5.24%
Table 7: Welfare cost of a stock price boom-bust episode
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No Tax 1% Tax 2% Tax 4% Tax 10% Tax
E[PD] 135.77 137.21 139.74 142.47 146.27
std(PD) 122.13 123.18 125.42 127.10 125.24
corr(PDt; PDt 1) 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
std(rs) 11.63% 11.85% 12.14% 12.55% 14.04%
E[rs] 2.11% 2.14% 2.18% 2.24% 2.49%
corr(PDt; EtRt+1) 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.89
corr(TVt; TVt 1) 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94
corr(TVt; PDt) 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.17
corr(TVt; jPt=Pt 1   1j) 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.05
corr(TVt; std( eEitRt+1)) 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.87
# of booms per 100 yrs 1.82 1.95 2.12 2.40 3.06
average boom length (quarters) 32.42 31.87 31.41 30.44 27.21
average boom peak (PD) 491.03 485.82 480.31 469.95 443.86
E[TV ] relative to no tax 100.00% 99.64% 101.49% 102.52% 117.85%
*A boom starts in the rst p eriod in which the quarterly PD ratio exceeds a value of 250 and ends once it fa lls b elow 200.
Table 8: E¤ects of introducing nancial transaction taxes
Gain 0.0316 0.0286 0.0264 0.0230 0.0180
1% Tax -0.34% -0.14% -0.02% 0.06% 0.25%
2% Tax -0.84% -0.36% -0.06% 0.16% 0.62%
4% Tax -1.56% -0.64% -0.07% 0.28% 1.18%
10% Tax -2.76% -1.00% 0.10% 0.39% 2.15%
Table 9: Welfare implications of FTTs
(welfare equiv. permanent cons. variations)
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No Tax 1% Tax 2% Tax 4% Tax 10% Tax
Boom times
E[PD] 424.63 419.79 415.04 406.56 384.06
std(PD) 44.93 44.13 44.27 42.89 42.01
corr(PDt; PDt 1) 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.53
std(rs) 23.06% 22.86% 22.52% 21.76% 19.34%
E[rs] 3.68% 3.74% 3.67% 3.55% 3.15%
E[TV ] rel. to no tax 100.00% 96.13% 93.12% 88.27% 80.13%
Normal times+
E[PD] 85.87 85.33 84.63 83.59 83.72
std(PD) 15.37 15.89 16.68 18.14 23.62
corr(PDt; PDt 1) 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.86
std(rs) 8.15% 8.36% 8.65% 9.31% 12.26%
E[rs] 1.84% 1.84% 1.88% 1.95% 2.32%
E[TV ] rel. to no tax 100.00% 99.60% 101.43% 102.69% 129.90%
* A boom starts in the rst p eriod in which the quarterly PD ratio exceeds a value of 250 and ends once it fa lls b elow 200.
+ Normal tim es are all those p eriods not classied as b oom periods.
Table 10: Conditional Asset Price Moments
Experience Groups 6-11 12-17 18-23 >23
0-5 0.33 0.11 0.01 0.00
6-11 - 0.30 0.00 0.00
12-17 - - 0.11 0.00
18-23 - - - 0.00
Table A.1: P-values for Equality of Gain Estimates
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No Tax 1% Tax 2% Tax 4% Tax 10% Tax
E[PD] 135.77 137.11 140.18 143.99 152.01
std(PD) 122.13 122.89 125.54 128.29 131.48
corr(PDt; PDt 1) 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
std(rs) 11.63% 11.72% 11.97% 12.26% 13.78%
E[rs] 2.11% 2.12% 2.15% 2.19% 2.41%
corr(PDt; EtRt+1) 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.89
corr(TVt; TVt 1) 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94
corr(TVt; PDt) 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.16
corr(TVt; jPt=Pt 1   1j) 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.04
corr(TVt; std( eEitRt+1)) 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.87
# of booms per 100 yrs 1.82 1.92 2.08 2.32 2.88
average boom length (quarters) 32.42 31.97 31.44 30.72 28.24
average boom peak (PD) 491.01 487.57 484.54 478.82 468.96
E[TV ] relative to no tax 100.00% 97.33% 97.96% 96.69% 105.66%
Table A.2: E¤ects of introducing nancial transaction taxes
(no tax rebate)
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Figure 1: Quarterly trading volume (% of outstanding shares, undetrended)
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Figure 2: Price growth expectations by experience group (UBS survey, real, in quarterly
growth rates)
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Figure 3: Response of the PD ratio to dividend growth shocks
Can a Financial Transaction Tax Prevent Stock Price Booms? 45
0
200
400
600
P
D
-0.05
-0.025
0
0.025
0.05
S
t-S
t-1
high gain
low gain
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
time (quarter)
E
t[R
t+
1]
Figure 4: PD ratio, trading and return expectations over a boom-bust cylce (baseline model,
no tax)
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Figure 5: FTTs and the likelihood of stock price booms
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Figure 6: Stock demand function (4% tax)
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Figure 7: Non-existence of equilibrium with state-contingent FTTs
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Figure 8: Multiple equilibrium prices with state-contingent transaction taxes
